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A SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE McELIECE PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
Bart Preneel1;2, Antoon Bosselaers1, Ren¶ e Govaerts1 and Joos Vandewalle1
A software implementation of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem is pre-
sented together with some existing and new extensions. The important dis-
advantages of the scheme are the data expansion, the size of the keys and
the fact that no digital signatures are possible. However, even a software
implementation results in a reasonable speed of encryption and decryption.
Moreover, the system can be used as a combined scheme that o®ers a both
encryption and error correction at the cost of a decreased security level.
1 Introduction
In 1978, McEliece proposed a new public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding
theory [13]. The system makes use of a linear error-correcting code for which a fast
decoding algorithm exists, namely a Goppa code. The idea is to hide the structure
of the code by means of a transformation of the generator matrix. The transformed
generator matrix becomes the public key and the trapdoor information is the structure
of the Goppa code together with the transformation parameters. The security is based
on the fact that the decoding problem for general linear codes is NP-complete [4].
In a ¯rst section a mathematical description of McEliece's system will be given.
Subsequently extensions and attacks will be summarized. Next some details are given
on the implementation of key generation, the encryption and decryption. Finally we
present our conclusions.
2 Description of McEliece's Public-Key Cryptosystem
For each irreducible polynomial g(x) over GF(2m) of degree t, there exists a binary
irreducible Goppa code of length n = 2m and dimension k ¸ n ¡ mt, capable of
correcting any pattern of t or fewer errors[3]. As it is a linear code, it can be described
by its k £ n generator matrix G. With the aid of a regular k £ k matrix S and an
n£n permutation matrix P, a new generator matrix G0 is constructed that hides the
structure of G:
G0 = S ¢ G ¢ P
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The public key consists of G0, and the matrices S and P together with g(x) are the
secret key. The new matrix G0 is the generator matrix of another linear code, that
is assumed to be di±cult to decode if the trapdoor information is not known. The
encryption operation consists of multiplication of the k-bit message vector by G0 and
the modulo 2 addition of an error vector e with Hamming weight t:
c = m ¢ G0 © e:
The ¯rst step of the decryption is the computation of c ¢ P ¡1. Subsequently the
decoding scheme makes it possible to recover m ¢ S from
c ¢ P¡1 = (m ¢ S ¢ G) © (e ¢ P ¡1):
The message m is ¯nally constructed by a multiplication with S¡1.
The disadvantages of the scheme are the data expansion, the size of the keys, and
the fact that no digital signatures are possible. On the other hand, the implementation
of the encryption part is much simpler, and for a comparable security level, the speed
of our general implementation is comparable to that of highly optimized code for the
well known RSA cryptosystem [16]. Moreover, it is one of the few still unbroken
public-key cryptosystems that is not based on any number-theoretic assumption.
3 Extensions
In this paper only public-key variations will be considered. A ¯rst extension originated
by F. Jorissen[7]. The idea was to add only t0 < t errors, such that t ¡ t0 additional
errors can be corrected. This implies that the security level degrades: under worst
case conditions no additional error occurs and the work factor of an attacker decreases
signi¯cantly. For some applications however, it could be very attractive to have a
combined system that automatically corrects some errors.
A second idea consists of improving the code rate by transferring some data
through the pattern of the error bits [5, 14]. It is important to note that this has
no e®ect on security if the data in the concealed channel is perfectly random, but
otherwise an attacker could obtain an important advantage.
A third extension is the replacement of the requirement of irreducibility of g(x)
with a di®erent condition: g(x) must be the product of non-repeating factors of degree
at least 2. It can be shown that in this case the error correcting capabilities are
unchanged and the bound on the dimension remains valid. A ¯rst consequence is an
increased key space. Secondly, the decoding algorithm has to be modi¯ed to take
into account these changes. For the implications on key generation and decoding the
reader is referred to section 5.
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4 Cryptanalysis
The known non-exhaustive attacks can be classi¯ed in three categories: a ¯rst type
of attack tries to compute the key or an equivalent key. However, it is shown in [1]
that the existence of an equivalent Goppa code is extremely unlikely. The conclusion
in [6] is that the task of the researcher who wants to assess the security is as di±cult
as the task of an attacker who wants to break the scheme.
A second type of attack aims at recovering directly the message m. The main
idea is to select and solve k of n equations obtained from c and G0. This attack was
already mentioned in [13], but has been signi¯cantly improved in by Lee and Brickell
[9] and by van Tilburg [18]. A ¯rst element is that the agreement between the resulting
message and the original message is systematically checked. The second improvement
is that j errors (j ¸ 1) in the k equations are allowed. The attack is then optimized
with respect to j.
A recent attack by Korzhik and Turkin [8] is based on an iterative optimization
algorithm, and the claimed number of operations to correct an error pattern with
weight at most t is claimed to be 20 ¢ n3. This would mean a major breakthrough,
but the validity of the work is in question and remains to be veri¯ed. Note that this
attack does not contradict the fact that the decoding problem for a general linear code
is NP-complete, as only error patterns with Hamming weight · t can be corrected.
The conclusion is that for m = 10 a maximal work factor of 271:1 is obtained if
t = 39. This implies that the resulting code has a length n = 1024, and a dimension
k ¸ 634. The information rate equals 0:619. The concealed channel could contain 235
bits.
5 Implementation
In this section, the key generation, encryption and decryption will be discussed in
more detail. For execution time and memory requirements, data will be given for the
case m = 10 and t = 39. Execution times were measured on a 16 MHz IBM PS/2
Model 80 containing a 80386 processor running under DOS. No use was made of
32-bit 80386 instructions.
5.1 Key Generation
This is certainly the most complicated part of the algorithm. It is certainly less critical
than the encryption and decryption, but the nature of the operations (e.g. inversion of
a k £ k matrix) requires careful coding if a reasonable performance is expected. The
key generation involves following steps:
Step 1 Select a primitive polynomial of degree m and prepare log and antilog tables
for GF(2m).
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Step 2 Select a generator polynomial of degree t, with no linear or repeating factors.
The ¯rst condition is easily checked, while the second is ful¯lled if
gcd(g(x);g0(x)) = 1:
Note that the probability that a random polynomial is irreducible, as was re-
quired in the original scheme, equals approximately 1=t, while a constant frac-
tion of about 1=e of all polynomials satis¯es the relaxed conditions. A proof of
this assertion is given in [19]. As a consequence, the time for ¯nding a g(x) is
reduced.
Step 3 Compute the parity matrix H over GF(2m) and Hbin, the parity matrix over
GF(2). The generator matrix Gbin can now easily be computed.
Step 4 Select a random n £ n permutation matrix P and construct the invertible
scramble matrix S as follows: S = S1 ¢S2, where S1 is a lower triangular matrix
over GF(2) with random entries and S2 is an upper triangular matrix over GF(2)
with random entries and with diagonal elements equal to 1. The inverse S¡1 is
easily computed as S¡1
2 ¢ S¡1
1 .
Step 5 The public key G0 is computed as S ¢ G ¢ P, and the secret key consists of S,
P an g(x).
This key generation takes about 5 minutes, and program plus data require together
about 560 K, which is quite close to the 640 K limit of the DOS operating system.
The size of the public key G0 is 79.3 K, while the secret key consists of S (49.1 K),
P (1.3 K) and g(x). The size of the secret key could be reduced signi¯cantly if S is
generated from a small seed. In [18] it is shown that a (di®erent) decomposition of G0
can be made public without decreasing the security level. This results in a public key
only slightly larger than k(n¡k) in stead of kn. For the usual parameters this would
be about 30.2 K. The price paid for this is in both cases that the scramble matrix
must be computed when it is needed.
5.2 Encryption
The encryption operation is very simple: it consists of a vector-matrix multiplication
followed by an addition of t random errors. The number of operations is kn, resulting
in a number of operations per bit of k with respect to the code bits and n with respect
to the information bits. The implementation in assembly language achieves a speed
of respectively 6 Kbit/sec and 3.7 Kbit/sec. With special hardware, this encryption
operation would certainly allow for speeds in the order of several Mbit/sec.
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5.3 Decryption
The most time consuming and complex step in the decryption is the computation of
the error locator polynomial.
Step 1 Apply the permutation P ¡1 to c.
Step 2 Compute the error locator polynomial corresponding to c ¢ P ¡1. The algo-
rithm of Patterson [15] is modi¯ed to take into account the fact that g(x) is not
necessary irreducible. In Step 2.2 an additional gcd has to be computed.
Let L be a subset of GF(2m) with the property that no element of GF(2m) is a
root of g(x) and let M = f° 2 L j e° = 1g. The syndrome S(x) is then de¯ned
as
S(x) =
X
°2L
c°
x ¡ °
mod g(x):
The error locator polynomial ¾(x) is de¯ned as
¾(x) =
X
°2M
(x ¡ °):
Decoding of the binary Goppa code means solving the key equation:
S(x) ¢ ¾(x) ´ ¾0(x) mod g(x)
where ¾0(x) denotes the formal derivative of ¾(x). The solution of this key
equation requires following steps:
Step 2.1 Split ¾(x) in an even and an odd part:
¾(x) = ®2(x) + x ¢ ¯2(x):
The key equation then becomes
S(x)(®2(x) + x ¢ ¯2(x)) ´ ¯2(x) mod g(x):
As deg¾(x) · t, we can conclude that deg®(x) · bt=2c and deg¯(x) ·
b(t ¡ 1)=2c.
Step 2.2 Compute g1(x) = gcd(S(x);g(x)). Note that if g(x) is irreducible,
g1(x) is constant. The factor g1(x) can then be removed from S(x) and
g(x):
g(x) = g1(x) ¢ g2(x)
S(x) = g1(x) ¢ h(x):
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Step 2.3 As h(x) is relatively prime to g(x), its inverse modulo g(x) can be
computed. The resulting equation is:
¯2(x)(x ¢ g1(x) + h¡1(x)) = g1(x)
³
®2(x) + q¤(x) ¢ g2(x)
´
Step 2.4 With following de¯nitions:
¯2(x) = g2
1(x) ¢ ¯2
1(x)
d2
1(x) ´ (x ¢ g1(x) + h¡1(x)) mod g(x)
d2
2(x) ´ g1(x) mod g(x)
d2(x) = d2
1(x) ¢ d2
2(x)
the equation simpli¯es to:
¯2(x) ¢ d2(x) ´ ®2(x) mod g2(x) (y)
To compute d1(x) and d2(x), a square root has to be extracted modulo g(x).
Two techniques are known to us to solve the equation a2(x) ´ b(x) mod
g(x).
² Extracting a square root is easy if b(x) has only even powers of x. It
can be shown [6] that every b(x) can be written in this form by addition
of ³
g0¡1(x) ¢ b0(x) mod g(x)
´
¢ g(x):
² Squaring is a linear operation and thus extracting the square root can
be done by multiplying with a precomputed matrix.
To optimize the speed of the implementation, the second alternative was
chosen.
Step 2.5 It is clear that a solution of
¯1(x) ¢ d(x) ´ ®(x) mod g2(x)
will result in a solution of (y) and thus of the key equation. The solution
will be unique if
deg®(x) · degg2(x) ¡ deg¯1(x) ¡ 1:
In case g2(x) is a power of x, Berlekamp's algorithm [2] can be used to
compute ®(x) and ¯1(x). Patterson [15] has extended this algorithm for an
arbitrary g2(x), but note that his paper contains an error, as was discovered
independently in [6]. An easier way to solve this equation is to apply
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Euclid's algorithm, till following conditions are satis¯ed:
deg®(x) · b
t
2
c
deg¯1(x) · b
degg2(x) ¡ degg1(x) ¡ 1
2
c:
The error locator polynomial is than given by
¾(x) = ®2(x) + x ¢ g2
1(x)¯2
1(x):
Step 3 The roots of ¾(x) indicate the error positions. For the usual parameters the
most e±cient way of determining the roots is simply trying all elements of the
¯nite ¯eld, with removing the corresponding linear factor when a root is found.
Step 4 Compute m by multiplying m ¢ S on the right with S¡1.
Most routines were coded in assembly language. Di®erent parts were optimized
such that the execution time is evenly distributed over the di®erent steps. The re-
sulting decryption speed is 1.7 Kbit/sec, and about 1 Kbit/sec with respect to the
information bits.
6 Conclusion
A software implementation of McEliece public-key cryptosystem was presented. The
key space was extended by allowing not only irreducible polynomials, but also poly-
nomials that have no linear or repeating factors. For the parameters m = 10 and
t = 39, an encryption speed of 6 Kbit/sec and a decryption speed of 1.7 Kbit/sec were
obtained on a 16 MHz IBM PS/2 Model 80. We believe this can be speeded up with
a factor of at least 2 by ¯xing all parameters (the current program is very °exible), by
coding all routines in assembly language and by using the powerful 32-bit instructions
of the 80386.
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